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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
LTHOUGH this article includes developments in the bank-
ruptcy courts, the author has attempted to limit the reported
cases to those involving state law, other developments that di-
rectly impact enforcement of the debtor-creditor relationship,' or cases
that might not otherwise be analyzed in a conventional bankruptcy sur-
vey. In other words, this is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of
bankruptcy developments, but rather an update regarding cases of inter-
est to the Texas based debtor-creditor practitioner.2
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. BANKRUPTCY REFORM
So-called bankruptcy reform legislation remained an issue during the
2002 session. The bill ultimately died late in the session due primarily to
the inclusion of some abortion related language when no compromise
could be reached. As of this writing, similar legislation had been filed in
the 2003 session, but its prospects for passage, and in what form, remain
uncertain.
B. CHAPTER 12 EXTENSION
In December 2002, President Bush signed legislation extending Chap-
ter 12 (family farmer bankruptcy) for what was then six months.3 As of
this writing, it is impossible to tell whether Chapter 12 will be extended
beyond this date. Recent history indicates, however, that it is reasonable
to assume an extension will pass, unless there are some unanticipated de-
velopments in related legislation that could stall further extension
legislation.
1. E.g., homesteads, exemptions, dischargeability, automatic stay, debt collection, etc.
2. Judge Leif Clark provides a thorough analysis of bankruptcy developments in the
Fifth Circuit in the Fifth Circuit Symposium published annually by the Texas Tech Law
Review. See Leif Clark, Bankruptcy, Survey Articles, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 579 (2002);
Leif Clark, Bankruptcy, Survey Article, 32 TEX. TECH L. REv. 667 (2001); Leif Clark,
Bankruptcy, Survey Articles, 31 TEX. TECH L. REv. 405 (2000); Leif Clark, Bankruptcy,
Survey Articles, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 441 (1999); Leif Clark, Bankruptcy, Fifth Circuit
Survey June 1996-May 1997, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (1998); Leif Clark, Bankruptcy,
Survey Articles, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299 (1997). For other, broader surveys that focus
exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, Re-
cent Developments, University of Texas Law School Annual Bankruptcy Conference (2002)
(national survey, with supplement limited to Texas and Fifth Circuit case summaries); Ger-
rit Pronske, Recent Developments, 19 STATE BAR OF TEX. ADVANCED BUSINEss BANK-
RUPTCY COURSE (2002).
3. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1201-1208 (2002).
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III. BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT AND
COURTS OF APPEALS
A. TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS DURING BANKRUPTCY
In Young v. United States,4 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sought
an unpaid balance of taxes owed by a Chapter 7 debtor. The debtor
claimed that the tax claim fell outside the "three year look back period"
because it arose out of a tax return due more than three years prior to
their Chapter 7 filing.5 The bankruptcy court re-opened the Chapter 7
case; however, because the three year look back period was tolled 6 during
the pendency of the debtor's prior Chapter 13 case, the court concluded
that the earlier tax debt had not been discharged. The district and circuit
courts both affirmed, as did the unanimous Supreme Court.7
B. MATTERS PENDING IN SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Archer v. Warner, after the
Fourth Circuit held that a pre-petition settlement of claims, arising out of
an alleged fraud or intentional tort, effectively extinguished the non-dis-
chargeable nature of the underlying tort claim in a subsequent bank-
ruptcy.8 The Fourth Circuit found such a settlement agreement to be a
novation, which substituted a dischargeable contract claim for what had
been a potentially non-dischargeable tort claim. 9 With this holding, the
Supreme Court was faced with a split among the circuits, 10 thus certiorari
4. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (2000).
6. The court in Young stated
It is hornbook law that limitations periods are "customarily subject to 'equi-
table tolling,"' unless tolling would be "inconsistent with the text of the rele-
vant statute[.]" Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in
light of this background principle. That is doubly true when it is enacting
limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of
equity and "apply the principles in rules of equity jurisprudence."
Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50. The court continued:
Tolling is in our view appropriate regardless of petitioners' intentions when
filing back-to-back Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 petitions-whether the Chap-
ter 13 petition was filed in good faith or solely to run down the lookback
period. In either case, the IRS was disabled from protecting its claim during
the pendency of the Chapter 13 petition, and this period of disability tolled
the three-year lookback period when the Youngs filed their Chapter 7
petition.
Id. at 50-51. See generally Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)
(adopting a general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the
government).
7. Young, 535 U.S. at 54. But cf. In re Froehle, 286 B.R. 94 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002)
(filing of bankruptcy did not toll running of debtor's post-foreclosure redemption period
under Iowa state law).
8. Archer v. Warner, 536 U.S. 938 (2002).
9. See also In re Warner, 283 F.3d 230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2002).
10. Compare In re West, 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1941) (obligation on note dischargeable
for fraud), and In re Fisher, 116 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1997) (claims arising from sale did not
qualify as nondischargeable debt) with United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir.
1995), and Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152 (11th Cir. 1983) (debt not dischargeable in
bankruptcy because the parties entered into a settlement agreement).
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was granted. As of press time, the Court had not disposed of this case;
however, a decision was anticipated by the end of the Court's term.
C. COURTS OF APPEALS
1. Preferential Transfers-Ordinary Course of Business Defense
In re Gulf City Seafoods, Inc."1 originated in a Mississippi bankruptcy
court; however, it has significant implications for preference cases
throughout the Fifth Circuit. This case dealt with the ordinary course of
business defense, more specifically, whether payments made by the
debtor during the 90-day preference period were made "according to or-
dinary business terms."'1 2 As with most preference cases, some recitation
of the facts is necessary.
Gulf City purchased, processed, and resold seafood products. Ludwig
was a seafood supplier to Gulf City. As part of a long-standing relation-
ship, Gulf City would take delivery of seafood and write Ludwig one or
more checks. Ludwig would not cash the checks right away, but instead,
would cash the checks when Gulf City indicated that it had sufficient
funds to cover the check. Typically, 40-45 days elapsed between the de-
livery of seafood and the date that the check or checks for delivery actu-
ally cleared. During the preference period, 24 checks cleared the debtor's
account, of which 17 cleared within 40-45 days, with the remaining seven
checks clearing within 10-18 days.
The bankruptcy court found, based on past practices between the par-
ties, that the checks all constituted payments in the ordinary course of
business, and denied the debtor's preference recovery. The district court
affirmed.13
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting the policy behind the
preference statute, namely to discourage favoring particular creditors
during a debtor's slide into bankruptcy.' 4 The court concluded, however,
that if a payment is made in the ordinary course of business, the Code
precludes the trustee from avoiding that transfer. "In other words, the
ordinary course of business defense provides a safe haven for a creditor
who continues to conduct normal business on normal terms," which is
also a critically important policy consideration.' 5
11. In re Gulf City Seafoods, Inc., 296 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2002).
12. Under § 547, payments made on account of an antecedent debt may be recovered
by the trustee or debtor in possession. Section 547 provides for numerous defenses, one of
which is that the payment was made in the ordinary course of business. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(2) (2000).
13. Gulf City Seafoods, Inc., 296 F.3d at 366.
14. Id. at 367 (citing In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, J.)).
15. Id. The court continued:
Without this defense, the moment that a debtor faced financial difficulties,
creditors would have an incentive to discontinue all dealings with that debtor
and refuse to extend new credit. Lacking credit, the debtor would face almost
insurmountable odds in its attempt to make its way back from the edge of
bankruptcy.
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The court attempted to discern between payments that are truly "ordi-
nary" between the debtor and the creditor and those that represent a
collusive arrangement designed to favor a particular creditor during the
debtor's financial hardship. Thus, the court noted the three elements to
the ordinary course defense: (a) the creditor must prove that the transfer
was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the creditor; (b) made in
the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; and (c) according to ordinary business terms.16
The first two elements focus on the relationship between the debtor
and the creditor. The third factor, however, deals with the issue of
whether payments were made "according to ordinary business terms."17
This was the determinative factor in Gulf City. In short, the court found
that this third prong focused not on the relationship between the parties,
but rather on payment practices within the industry. 18
The Gulf City opinion notes that this inquiry should be a supposedly
objective one, in other words, a comparison with the credit arrangements
between other similarly situated parties in the debtor's industry. Citing
Judge Posner's analysis in In re Tolona Pizza Products Corp.,19 the court
recognized that strict conformity to particular industry standards may be
inappropriate, noting that "ordinary business terms" refers to a range of
terms and encompasses the practices among firms similar in some general
way. The court further noted that "only dealings so idiosyncratic as to
fall outside that broad range should be deemed extraordinary and there-
fore outside the scope of subsection C.' '20 Unfortunately for the trans-
feree in Gulf City there was no evidence presented on the standards
within the industry. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
courts, remanding the case, which would presumably allow the transferee
to put on such evidence.21 To reiterate-this was a remand, and the court
did not render any decision regarding the ultimate treatment of these
payments.
2. Avoidance Actions-Standing of Creditor's Committees
No discussion of preferences and avoidance actions would be complete
without a mention of In re Cybergenics.22 In that case, a panel of the
Id.
16. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2000)) (emphasis added). In general, the ordinary
course of business defense requires a "peculiarity" tactical analysis. See generally In re
Gateway Pacific Corp., 153 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1998).
17. Gulf City Seafoods, Inc. 296 F.3d at 367.
18. Id. at 367-68 (citing Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d
30, 39 (2d Cir. 1996)); In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994).
19. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1993).
20. Gulf City Seafoods, Inc., 296 F.3d at 368 (citing In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3
F.3d at 1033).
21. Id. at 369-70. For an example of the expert testimony that may be dispositive on
this issue, see In re Bros. Gourmet Coffee, Inc., 271 B.R. 456, 462 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
22. The original opinion was reported at 304 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2002). But that opinion
has been withdrawn from publication pending an en bane hearing.
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Third Circuit initially found that a committee of unsecured creditors
lacked standing to assert avoidance actions, in particular a preference
claim. The Third Circuit subsequently ruled en banc to withdraw the
opinion from publication, and rehearing en banc was granted. As of this
publication, the Third Circuit's disposition of this issue was not known.
This is an important case, however, and it could have possible ramifica-
tions for practice in other circuits.
IV. BANKRUPTCY COURT CASES
A. HOMESTEADS AND EXEMP-ONS
1. Only Individuals May Claim a Homestead
In In re Monsivais,23 senior bankruptcy judge John Akard again writes
on the homestead issue. In this case, the debtors claimed an urban home-
stead exemption. 24 The debtors, however, did not hold direct title to the
property. Rather, title to the property was held by their family limited
partnership. Under the entity theory of partnerships, 2 5 however, the
partnership was essentially the owner of the property, not the individual
debtors. Therefore, the trustee's objection to their exemption claim was
upheld. This is consistent with earlier decisions that only individuals may
claim a homestead exemption to property when they have a direct owner-
ship interest.26
Apparently, family limited partnerships and similar entities have be-
come popular estate planning tools. That said, the concept of individual
ownership of a homestead, reinforced by the Monsivais decision,
survives.
2. Violation of Due on Sale Clause Does Not Affect Homestead Claim
In In re Rodriguez,27 the debtor and his father executed a deed of trust
containing a due on sale clause. The father conveyed his undivided inter-
est in the property to his ex-wife in a divorce settlement that the ex-wife
then conveyed to the debtor. The debtor subsequently claimed that prop-
erty as his homestead in his later bankruptcy. The court found that al-
though the conveyance may have violated the due on sale clause, giving
the mortgagee a contractual remedy, it did not deprive the debtor of his
homestead claim. 28
23. In re Monsivais, 274 B.R. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002).
24. Under Texas law, a family may claim an urban homestead exemption consisting of
up to ten acres. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (Vernon 2000).
25. Section 7.01 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act states that "[a] partner-
ship interest is personal property. A partner has no interest in specific limited partnership
property." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
26. See e.g., In re Cole, 205 B.R. 382, 385-86 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that a
family had abandoned a portion of their homestead by conveyance to their family limited
partnership). See also In re Pierce, 128 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 935
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Brooks, 103 B.R. 123, 125 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
27. In re Rodriguez, 282 B.R. 194 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
28. Id. at 197-98.
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B. DISCHARGEABILITY
1. Trust Fund Taxes-Responsible Person Liability
Generally, all debts arising prior to the filing of an individual's Chapter
7 bankruptcy will be discharged. Section 523 of the Code, however, pro-
vides a number of exceptions to that presumption.2 9 Among these excep-
tions is a debt arising from a tax or custom duty "with respect to which
debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to
evade or defeat such tax."' 30 In re Johnson31 applied this exception in the
context of a debtor who had been a "responsible person" of a corporation
that failed to pay over withholding taxes to the federal government.
Generally, the Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold
an employee's share of social security taxes and income taxes from his or
her wages. That money is withheld, effectively in trust, for the benefit of
the United States. 32 As "trust funds," those funds do not belong to the
employer, and they are not to be used in the general operations of the
business. If these taxes are not paid over, the employee is nevertheless
credited for the payment of those taxes, and the government may not
otherwise have any recourse for the collection of those taxes. Accord-
ingly, an additional layer of protection provided to the government is the
imposition of a "penalty" in an amount equal to the unpaid trust fund
taxes against any person who is under a duty to perform the act (or to
provide for the performance of the act) of forwarding those trust fund
taxes. 33
A threshold issue for the Johnson court was determining who consti-
tuted a responsible person that would be exposed to the responsible per-
son penalty. The court noted two elements: first, the person must be one
"required to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any tax."'34 This is
commonly the definition of a "responsible person." The second require-
ment for imposition of a penalty is that the person "willfully" failed to
perform one of those three functions. 35 Critically, the Johnson court
noted substantial authority to the effect that the responsible person have
some power, authority, or control over the process, regardless of whether
29. Among the debts excepted from discharge by § 523(a) are debts incurred as a re-
sult of fraud, reasonable reliance upon false financial statements, debts arising from a will-
ful and malicious injury, fraud in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, and numerous others.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2000). See generally, Annotation, Exception from Discharge of
Taxes Under § 523(a)(1) of Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)), 145 A.L.R. FED. 1
(1998).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (2000).
31. In re Johnson, 283 B.R. 694 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). This case was apparently
decided in 2000; however, the opinion was first published during the Survey period. Given
its importance and the thorough analysis of both trust fund tax liability and the dis-
chargeability of that type of debt, the opinion is discussed in this Survey issue.
32. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a) (2000). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (a) (2000). See
generally Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
33. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000).
34. In re Johnson, 283 B.R. at 701.
35. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000); see also Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729,
733 (5th Cir. 1983).
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he actually exercised it.36
In Johnson, the debtor apparently argued that he had delegated or at-
tempted to delegate the responsibility for paying the withholding taxes to
another person within the organization. Although not stated literally, the
court effectively found that this duty was non-delegable, noting that the
Fifth Circuit "looks at a number of circumstantial indicia of responsible
person status when a party lacks the precise responsibility of withholding
or paying the employees' taxes."'37 Among the various factors identified
by the Fifth Circuit, it is also important to note that no one element of
control or authority is necessarily dispositive. 38 The Gustin court cau-
tions that mere access to corporate funds does not necessarily make one a
responsible person.
Finally, an important factor in Johnson is that the plaintiff continued to
write checks to other creditors at a time when he knew or should have
known about the unpaid payroll taxes. "Evidence that a responsible per-
son had actual knowledge of payments to other creditors after he was
aware of the failure to pay withholding tax is sufficient for summary judg-
36. In re Johnson, 283 B.R. at 701. "The crucial inquiry is whether the individual had
the effective power to pay the taxes." Id. 0(quoting Barnett v. Internal Revenue Service,
988 F.2d 1449, 1454 (5th Cir. 1993)).
37. Id. at 701. These elements include the following:
(1) the holding of corporate office;
(2) the ownership of stock;
(3) the authority to sign corporate checks, either alone or jointly with an-
other officer;
(4) the authority to obtain financing or loans for the corporation;
(5) the authority to execute corporate loans for the corporation;
(6) personally guaranteeing the debts of the corporation;
(7) the authority to negotiate contracts for the corporation;
(8) the authority to hire and fire employees;
(9) the holding of a position as a member of the board of directors;
(10) the effective power to decide what creditors are to be paid; and
(11) the authority to purchase corporate assets.
Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
38. For example, the Fifth Circuit has held:
(1) [t]here is no requirement that a responsible person be a corporate
officer[;]
(2) [t]here is no requirement that a responsible person have access or con-
trol over books and financial records[;]
(3) [t]here is no requirement that a responsible person be an authorized
check signer[;]
(4) [tjhere is no requirement that a responsible person be a member of the
board of directors[;]
(5) [tlhere is no requirement that a responsible person be a stockholder[;]
(6) [t]he hope that sufficient money will be available later to pay the taxes is
not a defense[;] and
(7) [i]t is not stealing for an authorized check signer to pay taxes to the In-
ternal Revenue Service.
Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted). The court continued: "One does not cease to be a respon-
sible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others, nor do instructions from a
superior not to pay the taxes or the threat of being fired if one pays the taxes make one not
a responsible person under the statute." Id. at 703 (quoting Gustin v. United States, 876
F.2d 485, 491-02 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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ment on the issue of willfulness. ' 39 In other words, there is a duty to use
any available, unencumbered funds to pay an unsatisfied withholding ob-
ligation, and the failure to do so when there is knowledge of that obliga-
tion constitutes willfulness for purposes of the officer and director
penalty.
Moving to the dischargeability context, the court merely had defined
conduct (either a commission or a culpable omission) and willfulness on
the part of the individual debtor seeking the discharge. As noted, the
conduct element does not require an actual overt act; rather, a culpable
omission or failure to exercise the known duty will satisfy the conduct
element. As to willfulness, the court applied a three prong test: (i)
whether the debtor had a duty to pay taxes; (ii) whether the debtor knew
he had that duty; and (iii) whether the debtor voluntarily and intention-
ally violated that duty.40 In light of a list of detailed findings of fact,
which traced the various layers of authority enjoyed by the plaintiff, com-
bined with the plaintiff's failure to pay or cause the payment of the un-
paid taxes, the court found that the responsible person penalty imposed
on the debtor was not subject to discharge.4 1
Obviously, the foregoing analysis digressed a bit from the narrow issue
of bankruptcy dischargeability. The Johnson case is important, however,
to any prospective debtor's counsel involving a small business bank-
ruptcy. Anecdotally, this author has noted that unpaid withholding taxes
is a common problem among many closely held businesses. Thus, al-
though not apparent to the uninitiated, an unresolved trust fund tax issue
provides many traps for the unwary, including potential conflicts of inter-
est between the corporation and the individual principal. Additionally,
given this analysis of what constitutes a "responsible person," the uni-
verse of persons within the organization who might be exposed to these
penalties is probably much broader than most bankruptcy practitioners
would realize.
2. Materially False Financial Statements
Among the other exceptions to dischargeability are debts that are in-
curred upon a creditor's reasonable reliance upon a materially false fi-
nancial statement submitted with an intent to deceive the creditor.42 In
39. In re Johnson, 283 B.R. at 704 (citing Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1157
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Lattimore v. United States, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
40. In re Johnson, 283 B.R. at 706.
41. Id. Among the various findings of fact, the plaintiff had been a licensed attorney
for numerous years, describing himself as a "wills and trust" lawyer who knew estate tax
law. Id. at 699.
42. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B) excepts from discharge any debt "for money, property,
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit," to the extent that the debt is
obtained by the following:
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money,
property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
2003] 1153
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re Slonaker43 provides a good example of a court's analysis of a false
financial statement in a dischargeability context, especially the "reasona-
ble reliance" element necessary to establish non-dischargeability. In Slo-
naker, the court first found that in order to be "materially false," the
statement must contain information that is "substantially inaccurate. '44
The court continued that a financial statement is materially false if it
"paints a substantially untruthful picture of a financial condition by mis-
representing information of the type which would normally affect the de-
cision to grant credit . . .," and this may include material omissions.4 5 In
Slonaker, the debtor omitted from his financial statement the existence of
approximately $115,000.00 in loans outstanding from the debtor to his
parents. It also showed no encumbrance against property that was sup-
posedly gifted from the parents to the debtor. 46
More problematic for a bank in this situation is the satisfaction of the
supposedly objective reasonable reliance standard. Judge McGuire found
that this issue is a factual determination made in the context of the total-
ity of the circumstances, 47 and this reasonableness should be judged by
comparing the creditor's actual conduct with its own normal business
practice and the standards and customs of the industry, in light of the
surrounding circumstances at the time.
The court acknowledged that some additional investigation would have
been appropriate; however, the court concluded that an apparent act of
concealment of the loan was the type of omission "that would not have
been discovered through investigation. 4 8 Accordingly, the court found
reasonable reliance, noting that "[e]ven partial reliance is sufficient
"49
Finally, the court analyzed the "intent to deceive" element, noting
again that the court should consider the totality of circumstances to make
an inference regarding whether a financial statement was submitted with
(iv) that the debtor cause to be made or published with intent to deceive[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
43. In re Slonaker, 269 B.R. 595 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001). This opinion was issued
before the Survey period; however, it was published after the deadline for last year's Sur-
vey. Therefore, it is included in this year's Survey.
44. Id. at 603.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Among the circumstances mentioned by the court were:
(1) whether the creditor had a close personal relationship or friendship with
the debtor; (2) whether there had been previous business dealings with the
debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; (3) whether the debt was in-
curred for personal or commercial reasons; (4) whether there were any "red
flags" that would have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender; and (5) whether
even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of the
representations.
Id. at 604 (citing In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir. 1992)). The court noted that
the Ledford factors had been approved or used by the Fifth Circuit in In re Coston, 991
F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1993). See also In re Patch, 24 B.R. 563, 567 (D. Md. 1982).
48. Slonaker, 269 B.R. at 605.
49. Id. (citing In re Nance, 70 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)).
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an intent to receive. This includes a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a statement, combined with the magnitude of the resulting mis-
representation. 50 In conclusion, the court found the debt to be non-dis-
chargeable to the extent of the material omissions. The court also
awarded the creditor attorney's fees based upon contractual provisions of
the guaranty agreement giving rise to the debtor's obligation. 51
C. CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE
1. Secured Claims-Valuation and Lien Stripping
In re Gray52 addressed valuation of a motor vehicle in a Chapter 13
cram-down context. Generally, "a debtor is permitted to keep property
over the objection of a secured creditor if the creditor retains its lien...
and the debtor provides ... payments, over a time not to exceed the life
of the debtor's Chapter 13, plan that will total the present value of the
allowed secured claim (i.e., the present value of the collateral). '53
In effect, Gray is an example of how a Chapter 13 secured claim is
treated in the post Rash54 era, which in effect held that valuation would
be determined based upon the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a
like asset for the same proposed use. 55 This is commonly referred to as a
"replacement value" approach.5 6 That said, however, the bankruptcy
court is left as the trier of fact on this issue. 57
In Gray, the debtors proffered a Kelly Blue Book private party value,
while the secured creditor contended that the NADA retail value should
apply. The creditor further argued that given the debtors' credit condi-
tion, they would be forced to obtain sub-prime financing, which would
have generally been available only through a dealership sale.
The court used the NADA value as a benchmark; however, that retail
value included other hidden costs such as sales commissions, detailing
and refurbishment of the vehicle, limited warranties, and storage costs,
which should not be included in determining a replacement value in this
context. The court, therefore, adopted a mid-value approach between the
Kelly Blue Book private party value and the NADA retail. The court
indicated that it may have used the NADA retail value as a starting point,
but there had been no evidence presented on the specific add-on dis-
counts that should be applied. Thus, the court used a mid-point
50. Id. (citing In re Norris, 70 F.3d 27, 30 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of a statement combined with the sheer magnitude of the resultant
misrepresentation may combine to produce the inference of intent to deceive")).
51. Slonaker, 269 B.R. at 606-07. The court disallowed a portion of the attorney's fees
claim; however, for purposes of this holding, the critical issue is that attorney's fees were
included in the judgment of non-dischargeability.
52. In re Gray, 285 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
53. Id. at 381; see generally, Time & Method of Valuation Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 506, of
Security Held by Creditor of Bankruptcy Estate, 134 A.L.R. FED. 439 (1996).
54. Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
55. Rash, 520 U.S. at 965.
56. Gray, 285 B.R. 379 at 383.




The court then moved on to the applicable interest rate. While the
court acknowledged that the contract rate of 21% was "exorbitantly
high," the court nevertheless found that rate applicable. The court noted
the Fifth Circuit's rebuttable presumption in favor of the contract rate.59
The court noted that this presumption is rebuttable; however, a court's
general knowledge of a reduction in the cost of money is insufficient to
controvert that presumption.60
Finally, the court provided an in-depth analysis of whether a lien re-
lease must be provided upon completion of the plan payments. The court
found that nothing in § 1322 prohibited inclusion of a lien release provi-
sion in a plan.61 In effect, this allowed what has been called lien strip-
ping, which the court reconciled with earlier decisions on this issue.62
2. Secured Claims-Post-Petition Interest and Attorney's Fees
Under Bankruptcy Code § 506(b), an over-secured creditor is generally
allowed post-petition interest and reasonable fees provided for under the
original contract. 63 In re Cummins Utility L.P.64 indicates that this con-
cept is not as simple as it appears.
In effect, Cummins amounted to an orderly liquidation while the
debtor was in Chapter 11, pursuant to one or more asset sales allowed
under § 363.65 The court expressed concern about using § 363 essentially
to liquidate the debtor without the accompanying disclosure require-
58. Gray, 285 B.R. at 384.
59. Id. (citing Greentree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir.
1997)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 386-87. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (2000) (providing that a plan may
include any appropriate provision not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9) (providing that a plan may provide for vesting of property on confir-
mation or at a later time in the debtor).
62. Gray, 285 B.R. at 387-88. Compare Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (hold-
ing that Chapter 7 could not "stripdown" creditor's lien on real property), with In re
Thompson, 224 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that debtors could not obtain a
release of secured creditors' lien until debtors successfully completed their confirmed plans
and received discharge). See also In re Castro, 285 B.R. 703 (Bankr. Ariz. 2002) (finding a
lien release appropriate upon satisfaction of second claim and holding that Dewsnup does
not apply to personal property or to Chapter 13 cases).
63. Section 506(b) provides as follows:
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of
such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000). Subsection (c) provides for a surcharge against the secured cred-
itor's interest for the expense of preserving or disposing of property to the extent of a
benefit to the secured creditor.
64. In re Cummins Util. L.P., 279 B.R. 195 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000). Generally, § 363 governs the use, sale, or lease of property
outside the ordinary course of business. This sort of procedure, however, had previously
been approved in other cases. See e.g., In re First S. Sav. Assn., 820 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1997);
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ments found elsewhere in Chapter 11; however, it appeared to the court
that this "going concern" liquidation was supported by the secured lend-
ers (referenced collectively in the opinion as "the banks") and the un-
secured creditors' committee. 66 Thus, the court allowed this liquidation,
in which the banks apparently concurred and participated.
Ultimately, the banks, whose claims were over secured, sought recov-
ery of their interest at a post-maturity (i.e., default) rate, together with
recovery of a substantial amount of professional fees. The request for
interest included both pre- and post-petition interest.
The court first began its analysis under § 506(b) by limiting its holding
to post-petition interest, finding that the pre-petition interest and fees
would constitute part of the underlying secured claim, which would be
addressed by way of the claim objection process.67 The court also noted
another limitation, arising out of § 506(c), which permits the interest of a
secured creditor to be assessed to the extent of the holding and disposi-
tion costs incurred by the estate. Although there was no actual § 506(c)
surcharge sought, the court found an analysis under that section useful in
supporting the view that "the benefits to secured creditors of a bank-
ruptcy case ought to be considered in assessing their cost to unsecured
creditors," noting that in effect the extent of the allowance of fees and
expenses to a secured creditor effectively comes out of the pockets of the
unsecured creditors. 68 The court noted that the primary beneficiaries of
the going concern liquidation were the banks, whose claims were reduced
by over $10 million, while the debtor accumulated substantial unsecured
trade debt.69
Focusing on the interest claim, the court noted at the outset that the
default rate would be applicable, unless application of a lower rate is ap-
propriate upon "a balancing of the equities. '70 The court found that it
had broad equitable powers to consider a variety of facts and circum-
66. Although approved by other courts in certain situations (see the preceding foot-
note), many courts and commentators have struggled with the propriety of using § 363 to
liquidate a Chapter 11 estate or otherwise circumvent the disclosure requirements typically
found in Chapter 11. See generally In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (earlier
case expressing concerns about use of § 363); Richard I. Aaron, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUN-
DAMENTALS § 9:5 (2000 Supp.) ("Can a § 363 sale liquidate the Chapter 11 debtor?");
George W. Kinney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(F) and Undermining the
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 235 (2002) (analyzing different ways to interpret
§ 363(f)); Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37 (1999) (analyzing the organization of the
sub rosa plan). See also Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Section 363 Sales: Let the
Buyer Beware, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (2002) (analyzing Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. v.
Campbell).
67. Cummins Util., 279 B.R. at 201. The court denied recovery of the pre-petition fees
and interest, without prejudice to recovery of those matters through the banks' proof of
claim.
68. Id. at 201.
69. Id. at 201-02.
70. Id. at 202 (citing In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1060 (5th Cir. 1998)); In re




stances of the case, in addition to a finite set of factors suggested by the
banks. 7' The court noted that the banks had not imposed default interest
for more than a year pre-petition, and the court also discarded the banks'
arguments that the Chapter 11 filing added to their risk. "On the con-
trary, the layers of protection afforded a secured creditor by the Bank-
ruptcy Code... the oversight of the [d]ebtor by the United States Trustee
and the court, and the [d]ebtor's duty as a fiduciary for its creditors, in-
cluding the banks ... should have given the [b]anks added comfort that
their collateral was protected. ' 72 The court disposed of the three part
test urged by the creditor, including the relatively small "spread" between
the contract rate and the default rate in this case (approximately 2%).
The court found that because of the relatively insignificant return to un-
secured creditors, the amount of the spread took on additional impor-
tance, noting additionally that "the impact on other creditors is the most
important issue in deciding and whether default interest is appropriate. 73
In conclusion, and perhaps most importantly for future guidance, the
court simply held that "[w]here unsecured creditors are not being paid in
full (or at least close to it), allowing interest at the default rate is inappro-
priate."'74 Thus, the court allowed interest at the original contract rate,
but denied the request for interest at the default rate.
Moving on to professional fees, the court looked somewhat skeptically
upon the creditor's request for substantial professional fees, noting that
the case was in effect a "Chapter 3" case rather than a complex Chapter
11 case, given its focus on a quick sale of assets under § 363. Moreover,
the court found that the banks should have realized early in the case (per-
haps as early as the petition date) that they would be paid in full. Thus,
the analysis was undertaken in this context. 75 The court applied a "rea-
sonableness" standard under federal bankruptcy law, rather than state
law, considering the secured creditors' attorney's fees under the same
standards as those applied to counsel for a trustee or debtor in posses-
sion, considering also "the nature of the case and the manner of its
administration." 76
Noting the early reduction of the banks' collateral to cash, the court
found that only limited professional fees were warranted. That said, the
71. The banks urged a three part test: "[(i)] that the charge [would] not harm other
creditors; [(ii)] that the difference between the default and the regular rate is not punitively
great; and [(iii)] that the over-secured creditor has not obstructed the bankruptcy process."
Cummins Util., 279 B.R. at 200. The banks asserted this three part test was dispositive;
however, the court disagreed. Id. at 202.
72. Id. at 202 (citing In re Smyth 11l, 207 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 2000)); Sherr v. Win-
kler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1374 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
73. Cummins Util., 279 B.R. at 203. The case further notes the allowance of a default
rate in In re Southland Corp., where most other classes of creditors were "unscathed" by
that bankruptcy. Id. at 203 (quoting In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d at 1060).
74. Id. at 203 (citing In re Maywood, Inc., 210 B.R. at 93); In re Trinity Meadows
Raceway, Inc., 252 B.R. 660, 669 (2000).
75. Cummins Util., 279 B.R. at 203-04.
76. Id. at 204 (citing In re Hudson Ship Builders, Inc., 794 F.2d 1051, t056-58). Addi-
tionally, the court was to determine whether the services were duplicative or unnecessary.
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court allowed costs incurred in defending against what was apparently
some wide ranging discovery in an effort to challenge the banks' secured
claims.77 The court then reviewed individual fee applications and limited
them accordingly. The court also denied recovery of one lender's costs of
in house counsel, 78 separate outside counsel for one of the bank group
members, 79 and a collateral monitoring fee, calling the latter "an egre-
gious example of over reaching." 80
3. Post-Confirmation Chapter 13 Plan Modification
During the Survey period, at least three different bankruptcy courts
were faced with this issue: whether a post-confirmed Chapter 13 plan may
be modified to provide for surrender of collateral, the retention of which
was originally contemplated and confirmed in the plan. The net effect of
such a modification would be to relieve the debtor of the remaining mon-
etary obligations of the confirmed secured claim. For the reasons de-
scribed below, however, the answer is not as easy as it would appear. As
of the Survey period, these three cases reflect conflict among Texas bank-
ruptcy courts. This is also indicative of a conflict among the courts
nationwide. 81
First, in In re Coffman,82 the debtors had confirmed a plan under which
they retained a vehicle securing a local credit union's claim. After confir-
mation, the debtors experienced substantial mechanical problems with
the car, and ultimately "decided to rid themselves of the car by parking it
on [the credit union's] parking lot."'83 Thereafter, the debtors filed a plan
modification, which provided for surrender of the car and a substantial
reduction in the monthly plan payments. The credit union objected.84
Judge Jones denied the modification.
Although the court recognized the conflict among the various courts,
the court first found that § 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code specifically pro-
vides that a confirmed plan is binding on the debtor and each of the
debtor's creditors. Therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata, a con-
firmed Chapter 13 plan bars all issues that could have or should have
77. Id. at 205.
78. The court found this item was a part of the lender's overhead. Id. at 207.
79. Id. at 206-07. The court found the involvement of this lender's separate counsel,
"though undoubtedly well-performed," unnecessary and duplicative. The court acknowl-
edged situations where separate representation of a bank group member would be reason-
able and appropriate; however, the court held that it was unnecessary in this particular
case. Id. at 209 n.36.
80. Id. at 208.
81. See, e.g., In re Goos, 253 B.R. 416, 420 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000) (summarizing the
various and conflicting case law on this issue); see also In re Coffman, 271 B.R. 492, 495 n.2
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
82. In re Coffman, 271 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
83. Id. at 494.
84. Interestingly, despite the surrender of the car and the resulting reduction in the
proposed obligations of the debtor, the return to unsecured creditors was also reduced
from 9% to 0%. Id.
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been litigated at the confirmation hearing. 85 The court also recognized
that § 1329(a) authorizes certain modifications of confirmed Chapter 13
plans; however, that exception was found to be quite limited. This was
consistent with the court's apparent reliance on the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in In re Nolan,86 in which the court noted that § 1329(a) does not
expressly permit a modification that reclassifies or changes the nature of
a claim but, rather, only permits the debtor to alter the amount or timing
of certain payments.87
The court also noted the inequity of the debtor's retaining the collat-
eral for a certain period of time but, after a period of substantial depreci-
ation, surrendering the vehicle and in effect transferring the risk of
depreciation to the creditor. The court stated, "It is only fair that the
[debtors] bear the burden of depreciation. '88
Finally, the court rejected another argument that § 502(j), which allows
reconsideration of the allowance or disallowance of a claim for cause,
would authorize the modification. The court found there to be no evi-
dence of any extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, such as that jus-
tifying relief under an analogous procedure. 89 Because the debtors failed
to satisfy the "cause" standard, the court did not further address the equi-
ties of a re-classification of the claim under § 502(j). Therefore, the modi-
fication was not allowed.
Approximately two months later, Judge Houser addressed a similar sit-
uation (with slightly different facts) in In re Cameron.90 In Cameron, the
secured lender did not file a proof of claim, with the following effect: it
was allowed a secured claim in an amount equal to the value of the prop-
erty securing its claim, and any unsecured deficiency claim was in effect
disallowed. As in Coffman, the debtor allegedly experienced some diffi-
culty with the car, and she filed a modification proposing a surrender to
the secured creditor. The secured creditor objected to the modification.91
The court recognized Judge Jones' recent opinion in In re Coffman, and it
also noted the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Nolan. The court applied a
somewhat more direct analysis than in Nolan and Coffman, but it reached
85. Id. at 495; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2000) (establishing that provisions of a
confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor). See generally Sanders v. City of Brady,
936 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1991) (appellee arguing that bankruptcy proceedings barred all
of appellant's claims under the doctrine of res judicata).
86. In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000).
87. Coffman, 271 B.R. at 496 (citing Nolan, 232 F.3d at 532-33). See also 11 U.S.C.§ 1329(a)(1) (2000) (stating that the debtor may modify amount of payments on claims).
88. Coffman, 271 B.R. at 496. As the court quoted Nolan: "There is no indication that
Congress intended to allow debtors to reap a windfall by employing a subterfuge that un-
fairly shifts away depreciation, deficiency, and risk voluntarily assumed by the debtor
through her confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan." In re Nolan, 232 F.3d at 534.
89. Coffman, 271 B.R. at 498 (discussing the concept of "cause" in light of § 502(j) and
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
90. In re Cameron, 274 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
91. Id. at 459. The creditor proposed repossessing the car, subject to the debtor's re-
maining liable for the deficiency, to be treated under the plan with interest until that por-
tion of the claim was paid in full. This did not have any direct bearing, however, on the
court's analysis.
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the same conclusion-that is, that the debtor was not allowed to modify
her plan.
In effect, the court found that § 1325 allowed the debtor three alterna-
tives: first, she could negotiate an agreement with the secured lender; sec-
ond, she could confirm the plan over objection by the lender by satisfying
cram-down requirements; or third, she could surrender the car to the
lender. 92 Once the plan was confirmed, however, it became binding on
the debtor and each creditor. As stated in Coffman, § 1329(a) provided
the debtor with very limited options regarding post-confirmation modifi-
cations, none of which addressed the situation faced by the debtor. Ap-
plying simple rules of statutory construction, the court found that the
modification was not among the options specifically delineated by statute,
and therefore, this was not available to the debtor.93
The third case in this trilogy is In re Hernandez,94 in which Judge Steen
of the Southern District reached a different conclusion. As in the other
cases, the debtors' confirmed plan provided for retention of a vehicle (a
pickup secured by Household Auto Finance), which claim would be paid
under the confirmed plan.95 After an earlier confirmation to modify
treatment of another claim, the debtors filed a subsequent modification
to surrender their pickup in satisfaction of Household's claim, and
Household objected.96 Unlike the other cases, the motion to modify was
based upon a number of other circumstances that had befallen the debt-
ors, rather than mechanical complaints about the pickup. According to
the court, Household did not offer any evidence to rebut the debtor's
modification.
The court noted that two of the three commentators addressing this
issue had opined in favor of allowing post-confirmation modification. 97
Further, the court also recognized the Coffman and Cameron opinions;
however, the court found that it had the discretion to allow modification.
The court also found a somewhat broader application of §§ 502(j) and
506(a), which in turn provide for reconsideration of allowance or disal-
lowance of a claim and the determination of the amount of an allowed
secured claim. The court found that § 506(a) could be invoked "in con-
junction with any hearing on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." 98
The court also questioned the extent to which the concept of res judi-
cata is absolutely applicable to all Chapter 13 confirmations, especially
before completion of a plan and receipt of a discharge. 99 Finally, the
92. Id. at 460.
93. Id. at 460-61.
94. In re Hernandez, 282 B.R. 200 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2002).
95. According to the court, Household did not participate in the confirmation process.
Id. at 202.
96. The court noted that Household did not allege or offer any evidence that the cur-
rent value of the pickup was less than the original secured claim. Id.
97. Id. at 203 (citing 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1329.02 (15th ed. Rev. 2001) and
KEITH LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, § 264.1 (3d ed. 2000)).
98. Id. at 204 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
99. Id. at 205.
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court also found a slightly broader application of § 1329(a)'s provisions
authorizing post-confirmation modifications, especially when read in light
of § 1325, which permits surrender of collateral as a method of satisfying
plan confirmation. Thus, the court concluded that there is no absolute
bar to post-confirmation modification nor that confirmation of a Chapter
13 plan is necessarily res judicata as to all issues of a secured creditor's
claim. 00
Given that analysis, the court reached a conclusion contrary to
Coffman and Cameron and allowed the plan modification. The net effect
of these decisions, however, is an unresolved conflict among Texas-based
bankruptcy courts.
V. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. FORECLOSURE
1. Waiver of Fair Market Value Defense by Guarantor
In La Salle Bank National Association v. Sleutel,10 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a post-foreclosure deficiency judgment against the guarantor of
a mortgage debt, effectively validating the guarantor's contractual waiver
of what is commonly known as the fair market value defense.
The statute in question is section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code,
which governs the recovery of a deficiency judgment and provides a po-
tential defensive offset against the deficiency to the extent of the actual
fair market value of the property foreclosed.' 02 In La Salle Bank, the
deficiency defendant was a third-party guarantor (as opposed to the
maker of the note). As a threshold issue, the court determined that sec-
100. Id. at 207.
101. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Sleutel 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2002).
102. Section 51.003 provides as follows:
§ 51.003 Deficiency Judgment
(a) [i]f the price at which real property is sold at a foreclosure sale under
Section 51.002 [non-judicial foreclosure] is less than the unpaid balance
of the indebtedness secured by the real property, resulting in a defi-
ciency, any action brought to recover the deficiency must be brought
within two years of the foreclosure sale and is governed by this section.
(b) [a]ny person against whom such a recovery is sought by motion may re-
quest that the court in which the action is pending determine the fair
market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale
... [list of nonexclusive factors in setting fair market value omitted].
(c) [i]f the court determines that the fair market value is greater than the
sale price of the real property at the foreclosure sale, the persons against
whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are entitled to an offset
against the deficiency in the amount by which the fair market value, less
the amount of any claim, indebtedness, or obligation of any kind that is
secured by a lien or encumbrance on the real property that was not extin-
guished by the foreclosure, exceeds the sale price ...
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
The statute provides additional detail regarding how the fair market value is determined,
including specific factors to be considered, including marketing time, holding costs, costs of
sale, present value cash flow discounts, etc. Critically, if no person requests a fair market
value determination, the actual sales price is used to establish the deficiency. Id.
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tion 51.003 applied to guarantors.10 3
The documents executed by the guarantor included a broad form con-
tractual waiver of setoffs and defenses. 0 4 The enforceability of such a
waiver in the context of the deficiency statute was a matter of first
impression.
The court used established principles of statutory construction used by
Texas courts, including that known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
This effectively means that the inclusion of certain terms in one portion
of a statute implies that, where those terms are missing elsewhere, the
exclusion was intentional. In this case, the court noted that, although sec-
tion 51.003 did not address waiver, there were express waiver preclusions
in other portions of the Property Code. Thus, the court of appeals as-
sumed that the legislature intended to omit any anti-waiver provisions in
this particular statute.'0 5 Additionally, the court rejected the guarantor's
public policy arguments, noting in part that none of the authority urged
by the guarantor dealt with transactions between lenders and third party
guarantors.10 6
The Fifth Circuit specifically limited its holding to the waiver of offset
rights by a guarantor, withholding any opinion regarding waiver by any
other party (i.e., the maker or primary obligor). 10 7 In addition to the stat-
utory construction used by the court, this holding is also consistent with
holdings in other jurisdictions,108 and it is consistent with other Texas
cases enforcing guaranty agreements as written.109 One would assume,
103. La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 840 n.1 (citing Long v. NCNB-Texas Nat'l Bank, 882
S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ)).
104. The entire guaranty was not included in the opinion; however, the broad form
waiver language that the court found to be dispositive was as follows:
To the extent allowed by applicable law, Guarantor expressly waives and re-
linquishes all rights and remedies now or hereafter accorded by applicable
law to guarantors or sureties, including, without limitation: ... (III) any de-
fense, right of offset or other claim which Guarantor may have against Bor-
rower or which Borrower may have against Lender or the Holder of the
Note; . . . and (VI) all rights of redemption, homestead, dower, and other
rights or exemptions of every kind, whether under common law or by statute.
Id. at 840.
105. Id. at 840. According to the Fifth Circuit, this is consistent with the statutory con-
struction used by Texas courts. See, e.g., Collins v. County of El Paso, 954 S.W.2d 137, 147(Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied) ("Texas courts have adopted the principle of statu-
tory interpretation expressed as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that we are to
assume that the purposeful inclusion of certain terms implies the purposeful exclusion of
terms that are absent.") (emphasis added).
106. La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 840-841.
107. Id. at 841 n.4.
108. See e.g., Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Okla.
1992); Valley Bank v. Larson, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (Idaho 1983).
109. See e.g., El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp., 77 S.W.3d 374, 386 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (guarantor lacked standing as an "obligor" under usury
statute; guarantor also waived its right to assert obligor's defenses); Boyd v. Diversified
Fin. Sys., 1 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) (guarantor waived defense of
impairment of or failure to perfect security interest); SEI Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Bank One
Texas, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 840) (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (guarantor waived
right to have secured lender dispose of collateral before enforcing guaranty); see generally
Ginsberg 1985 Real Estate P'ship v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1994); Houston
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focusing on the statutory construction analysis, that the same rationale
would apply to the primary obligor, especially if faced with more specific
contractual waiver language. That issue, however, was not before the La
Salle court.
This same rationale was followed in the more recent state court case of
Segal v. Emmes Capitol, L.L.C.,I 0 which had not been released for publi-
cation as of the end of the Survey period. The Houston Court of Appeals
[First District] found that a more specific waiver11 I in a guaranty agree-
ment did not violate public policy, and specifically cited La Salle Bank in
finding that the statutory scheme in Chapter 51 did not preclude a waiver
of the anti-deficiency statute.1 12
Another issue raised by the guarantors in Segal was whether the sale of
land situated in more than one county was void by a single sale in only
one of the counties where the land was located. Although the court
found that the statute authorizing such a sale was ambiguous, it invoked
the concept of "statutory acceptance" of a prior published opinion au-
thorizing such a sale.113
From a practitioner's standpoint, the following bears repeating: the re-
lease signed by the guarantor was a broad form general release of all
defenses and rights of offset. 114 It was apparently this broad waiver of
Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979); Rucker v. Bank One Texas,
N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied.) (guarantor's summary judgment
evidence regarding possible fraud in the inducement and breach of contract precluded
summary judgment on guaranty).
110. Segal v. Emmes Capitol, L.L.C., No. 01-01-00460-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Oct. 10, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 31266203.
111. The guaranty in this case contained the following waiver: "To the maximum extent
permitted by applicable law, the Guarantor hereby waives all rights, remedies, claims and
defenses based upon or related to Sections 51.003, 51.004 and 51.005 of the Texas Property
Code, to the extent the same pertain or may pertain to any enforcement of this Guaranty."
Id. at *4.
112. Id. at *5 (citing La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 841-42).
113. Id. at *12. Section 51.002(a) states the following:
A sale of real property under a power of sale conferred by a deed of trust or
other contract lien ... must take place at the county courthouse in the county
in which the land is located, or if the property is located in more than one
county, the sale may be made at the courthouse in any county in which the
property is located.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(a) (Vernon 1995). The court apparently found the statute
was ambiguous because of the mixed use of the phrases "the lien" and "the property"
within the statute. Fortunately, the court reached a conclusion that was consistent with the
obvious intent of the statute, based upon the so-called doctrine of "legislative acceptance,"
under which the court assumed the legislature intended to follow the holding of Bateman v.
Carter-Jones Drilling Co., 290 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). In Bateman, the sale of five tracts of land in one single sale was valid even though
four of the five tracts were located in another county. In any event, the court appears to
have reached the correct conclusion, despite taking a somewhat tortured path to that end.
114. As mentioned supra note 103, the guaranty agreement provided:
To the extent allowed by applicable law, Guarantor expressly waives and re-
linquishes all rights and remedies now or hereafter accorded by applicable
law to guarantors or sureties, including, without limitation: ... (111) any de-
fense, right of offset or other claim which Guarantor may have against Bor-
rower or which Borrower may have against Lender or the Holder of the
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offset rights that ultimately provided the waiver of the specific anti-defi-
ciency fair market value defense. As discussed following the Reece Sup-
ply case below, it is of paramount importance for any counsel
representing a guarantor to convey the potential impact of such a broad
form waiver.
B. ABSOLUTE NATURE OF GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Crumb v. Reece Supply Co.115 is
also instructive on the absolute nature of guaranty agreements as en-
forced by Texas courts. In short, Farmers provided Reece with a written
agreement to pay the amount due for certain goods shipped by Reece to
a third party. Apparently, the third party contended that the goods
shipped by Reece were non-conforming or otherwise defective. The third
party refused to pay and instructed Farmers to make no payment either.
Neither the third party nor Farmers paid, and this suit resulted.
The court found that the guaranty was an unconditional guaranty, and
the obligations were absolute and not conditional.' 16
Because of the apparent non-compliance with the underlying contract,
Farmers asserted a failure of consideration and a claim for offset, based
upon the apparently non-conforming goods and the ultimate repossession
of those goods by Reece. The court was not convinced, however, reiterat-
ing that "Farmers was the primary, absolute, unconditional obligor.
Therefore, the asserted defenses of offset and failure of consideration be-
cause the transformers were unfit are not available to Farmers."1 17 Ac-
cordingly, the summary judgment granted by the trial court was affirmed.
The obvious lesson from La Salle Bank and Reece Supply is that guar-
anty agreements continue to be enforced by Texas courts in accordance
with their literal terms. A recent trend in bank generated loan docu-
ments is to contain broad form waivers like the one found in La Salle
Bank above. That language, together with the continuing unconditional
nature of most guaranty forms, leaves a guarantor with little in the way of
defenses. The negotiation of appropriate guaranty agreements should,
for most practitioners, become an even more critical part of the loan ne-
gotiation process. Otherwise, unwitting guarantors may be left to virtu-
ally unlimited exposure with little in the way of a defense.
Note .... and (VI) all rights of redemption, homestead, dower, and other
rights or exemption, of every kind, whether under common law or by statute.
La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 840.
115. Farmers & Merch. State Bank of Krum v. Reece Supply Co., 79 S.W.3d 615 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
116. Reece (the plaintiff) relied upon Universal Metals and Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539
S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976), which the Reece court found controlling. In part, Bohart provides:
"A number of judicial precedents have held that guaranties, like the one in this case, are
absolute rather than conditional, primary rather than secondary, and guarantees of pay-
ment rather than guarantees of collection." Bohart, 539 S.W.2d at 877.
117. Reece, 79 S.W.2d at 619 (citing Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Heaner, 577




In re Arturo Rodriguez 18 arose in a bankruptcy court, but it involves a
determination of the ownership of funds that were subject to a writ of
garnishment. A judgment creditor of the debtor successfully served a
writ of garnishment on the debtor's bank, at which time the bank held
$8,364.51 in an account maintained by the debtors. The judgment credi-
tor and the bank agreed to a judgment awarding the garnished funds to
the creditor (with a small allowance for the bank's attorney's fees).
Twenty-seven days after the state court signed the agreed judgment, the
debtors filed bankruptcy. At this point, the automatic stay of § 362 took
effect. The debtors thereafter sought turnover of the garnished funds.
The bankruptcy court found that the judgment had been entered prema-
turely because of the debtors' pending motion to dissolve the writ." 9
Crucially, the court found that the judgment of garnishment was not
self-executing. Quoting an earlier bankruptcy court decision, the court
noted, "In Texas, ownership of property subject to a judgment does not
transfer until a writ of execution is issued and levied."'120 Accordingly,
the court found that it was not the service of the writ or the entry of a
judgment that transfers title. Rather, it is the service of a writ of execu-
tion that ultimately transfers title in garnished funds.' 2 1 Because execu-
tion could not issue before the expiration of thirty days following the
signing of the judgment, the bankruptcy filing and the imposition of the
stay took effect before execution could issue.
Analyzing the turnover action, the court found that as Chapter 13 debt-
ors, they had standing to seek turnover under § 542 of the Bankruptcy
Code, even though the property would ultimately be turned over to the
trustee. 22 With the garnishee effectively serving as a "receiver or officer
of the court," and with no legal title to the funds under Texas law, the
bank was required to turn over the property to the trustee. Additionally,
given the debtor's claim of exemption in those funds, the debtors were
also permitted to avoid the creditor's judicial lien under § 522(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 123 The court discusses, but does not necessarily decide,
whether and to what extent a refusal to relinquish garnished funds consti-
tutes a violation of the stay. The court notes several cases, however, that
have addressed this issue.' 2 4 Given the facts of the case, it was not neces-
sary for the court to address whether and to what extent the imposition of
the garnishment lien would have constituted an avoidable preference
118. In re Arturo Rodriguez, 278 B.R. 749 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
119. Id. at 752.
120. Id. at 753 (quoting In re Benson, 262 B.R. 371, 378 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001), which
in turn quoted Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons, 904 S.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)).
121. In re Rodriguez, 278 B.R. at 753.
122. In re Rodriguez, 278 B.R. at 754 n.2.
123. Id. at 755. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2000) (holding that a debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien against property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled).
124. Id. at 754 n.l.
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under § 547. One would conclude that a preferential transfer action may
have been avoidable to the trustee had the turnover and lien avoidance
remedies not been available. 125
D. TEXAS TURNOVER STATUTE-THIRD PARTIES
In Maiz v. Virani,126 the Fifth Circuit addressed the applicability of the
Texas Turnover Statute12 7 to property owned by a non-debtor entity.
Specifically, the court found that the Texas Turnover Statute could not be
used to strip a corporation of assets prior to a final adjudication actually
piercing the corporate veil.128
In short, the effect of the court's ruling was to reiterate that the turno-
ver statute cannot be a substitute for an adjudication of a third party's
property rights. Thus, the turnover statute applies to property that the
debtor actually owns. 12 9
E. APPLICABILITY OF SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Aguero v. Ramirez, 130 a creditor sought judgment on a note more
than four years, but less than six years, after it had matured. The note
had been secured by real property; however, the creditor was seeking
only a monetary judgment on the note.
The issue before the court was whether the four-year statute of limita-
tions on real property lien foreclosure, or the six-year limitation found in
125. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the avoidance of certain trans-
fers, both voluntary and involuntary, made within the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing.
11 U.S.C. § 574(b) (2000).
126. Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2002).
127. The turnover statute is codified at section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. In pertinent part, that section provides:
(a) A judgment creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate juris-
diction through injunction or other means in order to reach property to ob-
tain satisfaction on the judgment if the judgment debtor owns property,
including present or future rights to property, that:
(1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal process; and
(2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfac-
tion of liabilities.
(b) The court may:
(1) order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property that is in
the debtor's possession or is subject to the debtor's control...
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
128. Id. at 346-47. The court relied, in part, on its earlier decision in Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Smith, 53 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1995). In that case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a turno-
ver order regarding stock owned by the judgment debtor; however, it reversed a ruling
invalidating a stock pledge to a third party. See id. at 80. See also Beaumont Bank v.
Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991).
129. As the court stated,
As we see it, [the turnover statute's] requirement that turnover property be
in the debtor's possession or control must be read in para materia with sub-
section (a) to mean that a court may order turnover of non-exempt property
that is in the debtor's possession or subject to the debtor's control only when
the judgment debtor owns (has title to) the property in the first place.
Maiz, 311 F.3d at 343 (emphasis added).
130. Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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the Texas Business & Commerce Code, applied. 31 The court acknowl-
edged the applicability of the four-year limitation would have precluded
foreclosure of the underlying deed of trust lien; however, the court found
that "[w]here there is a debt secured by a note, which is, in turn, secured
by a lien, the note and the lien constitute separate obligations."132 There-
fore, the four-year limitation would not apply to a suit directly on the
note, which was governed by the six-year statute of limitations.' 33
F. HOMESTEADS-JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
In National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Taylor,134 the state court found that
debtor statements in earlier filed schedules in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding constituted judicial estoppel135 in a later action for foreclo-
sure on property claimed as the debtor's homestead. Specifically, the
debtors had purchased a modular home and borrowed money from the
former United Bank of Waco. The bank made the advance, and it ap-
peared that the loan proceeds were disbursed to the seller. The debtors
alleged, however, that the lender and the other parties to the original
transaction did not comply with the constitutional and statutory require-
ments regarding construction of residential improvements on a home-
stead. The court did not need to address that issue, however, because the
debtors had earlier listed United Bank as a secured creditor in their
Chapter 7 bankruptcy schedules. The court found that the concept of
judicial estoppel applied to those schedules, which precluded the debtors
from taking an inconsistent position in the state court litigation.' 36
131. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035 (Vernon 2002) (four year
limitation on foreclosure of a lien secured by real property), with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.118(a) (Vernon 2002) (six year statute of limitation on enforcement of promissory
note).
132. Aguero, 70 S.W.3d at 374 (citing Wittington v. Wittington, 853 S.W.2d 193, 195
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ)). The court also cited numerous cases, finding that
one remedy could be invoked while the other may have been barred. See e.g., Henson v.
C.C. Slaughter Co., 206 S.W. 375, 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1918, no writ) (debt held
time barred, but real property lien foreclosed); Adams v. Harris, 190 S.W. 245, 246 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1916, no writ) (debt enforced, but action to foreclose liens held to
be barred). But cf. Univ. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sec. Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex.
1967) (lien given priority).
133. Id. The court found that section 3.118 applied to an action to enforce the obliga-
tion of a party to pay a note while section 16.035 applied to a suit "for the recovery of real
property." Id.
134. Nat'l Loan Investors, L.P. v. Taylor, 79 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet.
denied).
135. "Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of judicial proceedings by precluding a
party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding which is inconsistent with a position
previously taken by the party." Id. at 636. See also Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d
266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Phillips, 124 B.R. 712, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
136. Taylor, 79 S.W.3d at 636-37. The court found that the bankruptcy schedules met
the requirements of judicial estoppel because it:
[1.] was filed in a prior judicial proceeding;
[2.] was inconsistent with their current position;
[3.] was made under oath;
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VI. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The Fifth Circuit addressed two cases involving the Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act (FDCPA). 137 Of most practical importance to the
creditor's rights lawyer is Peter v. G.C. Services, LP.138 Peter addressed
the initial "Miranda" style warning required by the statute and the possi-
ble "overshadowing" effect of potentially contradictory statements in the
same letter. 139 In the context of the "overshadowing" issue, practitioners
have awaited a specific Fifth Circuit decision on the standard that is used
to determine whether a communication is confusing. Some courts use a
"least sophisticated consumer standard," while others employ the more
lenient inquiry of whether a reasonable consumer would be confused.
The Fifth Circuit still refused to adopt any one standard other than to
refer to an earlier decision, which came close to (but still fell short of)
adopting a least sophisticated consumer standard. 140
In Peter, the statement in question stated that "full collection activity
will continue" until paid in full.141 The court found that when the letter
was read as a whole, those words did not misrepresent, contradict, or
overshadow the language explaining the debtor's statutory rights under
the Act. 142
The court noted, with apparent approval, earlier cases in which a key
factor was the specific time that payment or other activity was demanded
in comparison to the thirty-day notice in the statute. The court observed
[4.] worked an advantage to the Taylors, because it lulled [the creditor] into
not taking action within the bankruptcy, [which would have been a more
appropriate time to seek a lien validity determination];
[5.] was not made inadvertently or because of mistake, fraud, or duress, and
[6.] was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
Id. at 637. Accordingly, the court found that the Taylors were judicially estopped to assert
that the present owner of the note did not have a lien against their purported homestead
property.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1962(o) (2000). This statute applies to the collection of debts in-
curred for personal, family, or household use.
138. Peter v. G.C. Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2002).
139. Section 1692(g) governs initial communications. It requires that within five days of
the initial communication to a consumer debtor, a debt collector provide written notice
containing the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.
It also requires a written statement explaining that unless the debtor "disputes the validity
of the debt" within thirty days, the debt collector will assume the debt is valid; that if the
debtor notifies the collector the debt is disputed, "the debt collector will obtain verification
of the debt..."; and upon the debtor's request, the debt collector will provide the name
and address of the original creditor. If the debtor requests verification, the debt collector
must cease collection efforts until the requested information is mailed to the consumer.
(The statute does not, however, require the debt collector to tell the debtor that it must
cease collection under these circumstances). 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692(a)-(b) (2000).
140. Peter, 310 F.3d at 349 n.1 (discussing the distinctions between the "least sophisti-
cated consumer," "reasonable consumer," and "unsophisticated consumer standards") (ci-
tations omitted). The court noted its reluctance to adopt specifically any one of these
standards. The court referred to its earlier opinion in Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, Delaunay,
& Dorand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997).
141. Peter, 310 F.3d at 347.
142. Id. at 350.
2003] 1169
SMU LAW REVIEW
that the common thread among cases finding a violation was demand for
payment within a specific time less than thirty days, while cases involving
either no specific deadline or a demand of greater than thirty days found
no violation. 143 The court concluded that because the challenged lan-
guage in the instant case "did not demand payment in a specific time
period shorter than 30 days, we conclude that the letter did not violate
§ 1692(g)."1 44 The Fifth Circuit did not specifically hold in Peter that a
demand for payment within less than thirty days in the first notice vio-
lates the FDCPA, but some may argue that the implication is present.
The court did find a violation of the FDCPA because of the creditor's
envelope, which contained the name and address of the United States
Department of Education, as well as a "penalty for private use" notice.
This was misleading and violated the FDCPA. The Fifth Circuit rejected
the collection agency's argument that the language on the outside of the
envelope was "benign," finding that its "impersonation of the Depart-
ment of Education is certainly not benign."' 45 Because of the misleading
nature of the envelope, the court found a violation of the statute and
remanded the case for entry of judgment for statutory damages, costs,
and attorney's fees.
The court also addressed the FDCPA in a slightly different context in
Hamilton v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc. 146 In that case, which
arose in a district court in Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit held that a group
health insurer's contractual subrogation claim was in the nature of a
"debt." Thus, the subrogation enforcement activities were subject to the
requirements of the FDCPA. 147
143. Id. at 349-50. Compare Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
juxtaposition of the one-week and thirty-day crucial periods is to turn the required disclo-
sure into legal gibberish."), and Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Servs., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1226-
27 (9th Cir. 1989) (demand for payment within 10 days confused least sophisticated con-
sumer), with Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1977) (request for immediate
phone call did not contradict printed notice), and Vasquez v. Gertler & Gertler, Ltd., 987
F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (request for payment without "further delay" did not
contradict thirty day notice).
144. Peter, 310 F.3d at 350. According to the Fifth Circuit, the district court relied upon
a Third Circuit opinion which approved use of the word "immediately" in what was
phrased as a request rather than a demand. Id. at 350 n.4 (citing Wilson v. Quadramed
Corp., 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000)).
145. Id. at 351-52. Some authority cited in the opinion indicates that "benign language"
on an envelope does not violate the Act; however, the court did not reach the issue of
whether the Act actually contains such an exemption that was unnecessary, given the
court's reaction to the impersonation of a government agency. The envelope was held to
violate the Act's prohibition of the use of any business, company, or organization name
other than the true name of the debt collector. Id. at 352 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(14)).
146. Hamilton v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 310 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2002).
147. Id. at 388-89.
[Vol. 561170
